What happened
In October 2026 an attacker got hold of the credentials of the ConnectWise Cloud Backup app, formerly sold as SkyKick. On 15 October, according to Huntress, the attacker used them to request Microsoft Graph tokens in customer tenants, one tenant after another. How the credentials were obtained hasn’t been published.
Huntress reported that, as of 17 October, sign-ins from the attacker’s address had been seen in almost 1,000 tenants, more than 300 of them successful. Microsoft reported sign-in attempts against more than 2,250 tenants, most of them unsuccessful, and attributed the attack to an actor it tracks as Storm-0940. In some environments a ConnectWise management app assigned itself the Global Administrator role, and credentials were added to apps to stay in the tenant. Huntress saw new secrets, valid until 2028, on an MSP management app and on another vendor’s app. Microsoft also reports that secrets were read at scale from Azure Key Vaults.
How much data left those tenants is still unknown. Directory reads through Graph aren’t written to the audit log. They only show up in Microsoft Graph activity logs, which need Entra ID P1/P2 and only exist if the organization turned them on in advance. So "we saw nothing taken" reflects a visibility gap, not a finding that clears anyone. Microsoft says the same: no results in the logs isn’t proof that no access occurred.
Why it worked: three architecture decisions
1. One credential for every customer. The app is multi-tenant. A tenant admin grants admin consent once, and from then on the vendor can request a token whenever it wants, using a credential the vendor holds. Here the same credential served every customer, so whoever held it effectively was the backup app in every tenant that had approved it.
2. Broad, standing permissions. The app could read and write every mailbox, including through EWS (per Todyl), plus OneDrive, SharePoint and Teams. Write access is only needed at restore time, but it was active all the time.
3. The access stays when the product is no longer used. Cancelling a subscription stops the invoice. It doesn’t delete the enterprise application or revoke the consent. Microsoft says to review tenants where the apps were ever installed or authorized, even if the integration is no longer in use.
Why the usual defenses didn’t help
- MFA protects users. No user signed in here, only an app with the vendor’s credential.
- Firewall IP blocking didn’t help, because the sign-ins went from the attacker straight to Microsoft and never crossed the customer’s network.
- Conditional Access for workload identities doesn’t cover third-party multi-tenant SaaS apps, according to Microsoft.
- Security clauses in the MSP contract cover people’s accounts. This credential belonged to the MSP’s own vendor.
What a backup vendor’s architecture should look like
- No long-lived secrets. The app can authenticate to Entra ID with workload identity federation and a managed identity, so a token can only be issued from the vendor’s own infrastructure, not from any server holding a stolen file.
- Separation between customers. A separate identity per customer or per group of customers. At the very least, vendor-side monitoring that spots a credential "sweeping" through tenants.
- Separate backup from restore. The backup app gets read-only permissions. Restore rights are granted just in time with the customer admin’s approval, and removed when the restore ends.
- Least privilege. A backup product doesn’t need Directory.ReadWrite.All, and certainly not an admin role.
- Clean up when a customer leaves. When a subscription ends, the vendor stops issuing tokens for that tenant and tells the customer to delete the app.
For comparison, this is how we built Griffin31. Tenant access is read-only, with the Global Reader role, and tokens come through workload identity federation, with no secrets and no certificates. Griffin31 isn’t a backup tool, but the principle is the same: what isn’t stored can’t leak.
Vendor review for Microsoft 365 backup: what to ask from now on
- Identity and credentials: How does the app authenticate to Entra ID: secret, certificate or federation?
- Is the same credential used for every customer? If so, what limits the damage when it leaks?
- Where is the credential stored, who can reach it, and how often is it rotated?
- Permissions: What is the full list of permissions the app requests, and why is each one needed?
- If we only need to back up part of the organization, such as one department or certain sites, can you narrow the permissions to match? For example RBAC for Applications in Exchange to limit access to a group of mailboxes, and Sites.Selected in SharePoint to limit it to specific sites, instead of access to the whole tenant.
- Does the app ask for directory permissions or an admin role? If so, why?
- Monitoring: How do you detect unusual use of the credential, such as a sign-in from an address outside your infrastructure or access to many tenants in a row?
- Which addresses or ranges does the service use to reach our tenant, so we can spot anomalies in our logs?
- Lifecycle: What happens to the consent and the access when the subscription ends?
What to do in your tenant this week
- If ConnectWise Cloud Backup (SkyKick) is, or ever was, installed in your tenant: disable the apps (Enterprise applications › Properties › Enabled for users to sign-in = No) and don’t delete them, so the evidence is kept. Find them by application ID, not by name (list below). Keep them disabled until ConnectWise publishes restoration instructions, and review activity from 15 October and service principal sign-ins from 1 October.
- Inventory and clean up: review every enterprise application that holds application permissions, and remove consent for products you no longer use, especially leftovers from a previous MSP. See also our guide to Microsoft Graph permissions and consent.
- Controlled approval: set up the admin consent workflow so every request to approve an app goes through the CISO, who checks that the vendor passed a vendor review before the app gets access to the tenant.
- Alerts: when a secret or certificate is added to an app, and when an admin role is assigned to a service principal.
- Single-tenant apps: protect them with Workload ID. Apps registered in your own tenant, such as internal integrations and scripts, can be placed under Conditional Access for workload identities. What you get: the app only receives tokens from your organization’s IP ranges, so a leaked credential won’t work from an attacker’s server; automatic blocking when ID Protection flags the app as risky; and when you disable the app or risk is detected, apps that support CAE have their active Graph tokens rejected without waiting for them to expire. It needs a Workload ID Premium license. The policy doesn’t apply to vendors’ multi-tenant apps, like the backup app in this case, so for those your protection is the vendor review and least privilege.
- Logs: keep service principal sign-ins outside the tenant. On Entra ID Free they’re kept for only 7 days, and exporting them needs at least Entra ID P1.
- Ask your backup vendor: ask them to move your setup to read-only, with write permissions granted just in time for restores only. If they can’t, that’s a finding in your vendor review.
The ConnectWise application IDs to search for in your tenant:
ConnectWise Cloud Backup 506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae
ConnectWise - MS Teams 24205314-2b89-4e07-a2a4-579e898a5640
ConnectWise - MS Graph 0de14c77-b9b0-4137-9360-34878a929827
SkyKick Partner Portal c921256f-04a7-44e8-9b2a-69c33929ba19How Griffin31 helps
Griffin31 checks the apps and permissions in your tenant continuously, so you can see which third-party apps have access. It doesn’t check the vendor itself, only what sits in your tenant. The recommendations to check are:
- Review unfamiliar or unneeded Enterprise Applications: which third-party apps hold access to your tenant, and which are no longer used.
- Review unfamiliar or unneeded App Registrations: which registered apps in your tenant have no use.
- Conditional Access for Workload Identities: protection for single-tenant apps registered in your tenant. It doesn’t apply to vendors’ multi-tenant apps.
- Block password credentials for applications: whether your apps hold long-lived secrets.
- Review GDAP admin role assignments for partner relationships: which admin rights partners and MSPs hold.
The bottom line
Your MSP’s vendors are your vendors too. A backup tool, by definition, holds access to all of the organization’s data. That’s why it has to meet the highest bar: no shared keys, no standing write permissions, and access that disappears the day the relationship ends.
Want to know your exposure to third-party apps in Microsoft 365? Book a meeting with Griffin31 and we’ll go through every app that holds access to your tenant. We’re also happy to help you update your vendor review so it covers today’s threats.
Sources
- Huntress: ConnectWise (SkyKick) vendor credentials abused in M365 attacks
- Huntress Support: 2026 October SkyKick
- The Hacker News: Hackers use compromised ConnectWise credential to sign in to Microsoft 365 tenants
- Todyl: Unauthorized access through the ConnectWise Cloud Backup Microsoft 365 app
- Microsoft Security: AI-driven, large-scale nation-state campaign using ARTEX enables supply chain compromise
- Microsoft: Conditional Access for workload identities
- Microsoft: Continuous access evaluation for workload identities
- Microsoft: Microsoft Entra data retention