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One credential, hundreds of tenants: what the ConnectWise backup breach teaches about Microsoft 365 backup vendors

12 November 2026

Threats

One backup app credential gave an attacker a way into hundreds of Microsoft 365 tenants. What happened, why MFA and the firewall didn’t help, and what to ask your backup vendor from now on.

What happened

In October 2026 an attacker got hold of the credentials of the ConnectWise Cloud Backup app, formerly sold as SkyKick. On 15 October, according to Huntress, the attacker used them to request Microsoft Graph tokens in customer tenants, one tenant after another. How the credentials were obtained hasn’t been published.

Huntress reported that, as of 17 October, sign-ins from the attacker’s address had been seen in almost 1,000 tenants, more than 300 of them successful. Microsoft reported sign-in attempts against more than 2,250 tenants, most of them unsuccessful, and attributed the attack to an actor it tracks as Storm-0940. In some environments a ConnectWise management app assigned itself the Global Administrator role, and credentials were added to apps to stay in the tenant. Huntress saw new secrets, valid until 2028, on an MSP management app and on another vendor’s app. Microsoft also reports that secrets were read at scale from Azure Key Vaults.

How much data left those tenants is still unknown. Directory reads through Graph aren’t written to the audit log. They only show up in Microsoft Graph activity logs, which need Entra ID P1/P2 and only exist if the organization turned them on in advance. So "we saw nothing taken" reflects a visibility gap, not a finding that clears anyone. Microsoft says the same: no results in the logs isn’t proof that no access occurred.

Why it worked: three architecture decisions

1. One credential for every customer. The app is multi-tenant. A tenant admin grants admin consent once, and from then on the vendor can request a token whenever it wants, using a credential the vendor holds. Here the same credential served every customer, so whoever held it effectively was the backup app in every tenant that had approved it.

2. Broad, standing permissions. The app could read and write every mailbox, including through EWS (per Todyl), plus OneDrive, SharePoint and Teams. Write access is only needed at restore time, but it was active all the time.

3. The access stays when the product is no longer used. Cancelling a subscription stops the invoice. It doesn’t delete the enterprise application or revoke the consent. Microsoft says to review tenants where the apps were ever installed or authorized, even if the integration is no longer in use.

Why the usual defenses didn’t help

What a backup vendor’s architecture should look like

For comparison, this is how we built Griffin31. Tenant access is read-only, with the Global Reader role, and tokens come through workload identity federation, with no secrets and no certificates. Griffin31 isn’t a backup tool, but the principle is the same: what isn’t stored can’t leak.

Vendor review for Microsoft 365 backup: what to ask from now on

  1. Identity and credentials: How does the app authenticate to Entra ID: secret, certificate or federation?
  2. Is the same credential used for every customer? If so, what limits the damage when it leaks?
  3. Where is the credential stored, who can reach it, and how often is it rotated?
  4. Permissions: What is the full list of permissions the app requests, and why is each one needed?
  5. If we only need to back up part of the organization, such as one department or certain sites, can you narrow the permissions to match? For example RBAC for Applications in Exchange to limit access to a group of mailboxes, and Sites.Selected in SharePoint to limit it to specific sites, instead of access to the whole tenant.
  6. Does the app ask for directory permissions or an admin role? If so, why?
  7. Monitoring: How do you detect unusual use of the credential, such as a sign-in from an address outside your infrastructure or access to many tenants in a row?
  8. Which addresses or ranges does the service use to reach our tenant, so we can spot anomalies in our logs?
  9. Lifecycle: What happens to the consent and the access when the subscription ends?

What to do in your tenant this week

The ConnectWise application IDs to search for in your tenant:

ConnectWise Cloud Backup           506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae
ConnectWise - MS Teams            24205314-2b89-4e07-a2a4-579e898a5640
ConnectWise - MS Graph            0de14c77-b9b0-4137-9360-34878a929827
SkyKick Partner Portal            c921256f-04a7-44e8-9b2a-69c33929ba19

How Griffin31 helps

Griffin31 checks the apps and permissions in your tenant continuously, so you can see which third-party apps have access. It doesn’t check the vendor itself, only what sits in your tenant. The recommendations to check are:

  1. Review unfamiliar or unneeded Enterprise Applications: which third-party apps hold access to your tenant, and which are no longer used.
  2. Review unfamiliar or unneeded App Registrations: which registered apps in your tenant have no use.
  3. Conditional Access for Workload Identities: protection for single-tenant apps registered in your tenant. It doesn’t apply to vendors’ multi-tenant apps.
  4. Block password credentials for applications: whether your apps hold long-lived secrets.
  5. Review GDAP admin role assignments for partner relationships: which admin rights partners and MSPs hold.

The bottom line

Your MSP’s vendors are your vendors too. A backup tool, by definition, holds access to all of the organization’s data. That’s why it has to meet the highest bar: no shared keys, no standing write permissions, and access that disappears the day the relationship ends.

Want to know your exposure to third-party apps in Microsoft 365? Book a meeting with Griffin31 and we’ll go through every app that holds access to your tenant. We’re also happy to help you update your vendor review so it covers today’s threats.

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